Standing Committee B

[Mr.Eric Illsley in the Chair]

Criminal Justice Bill

Clause 265 - Orders and rules

Graham Allen: I beg to move amendment No. 111, in
clause 265, page 147, line 31, at end add 
 'and— 
 (c) may be exercised for the purpose of improving incentives for the collection of fines.'.
 The amendment is self-explanatory.

Hilary Benn: We have discussed fine enforcement several times in Committee. As my hon. Friend will have gathered, the Government are interested in the issue and take it seriously. That is the reason for the provisions that we are including in the Courts Bill. I shall remind my hon. Friend of those and ask him to withdraw his amendment on the basis that it concerns something that we are already doing.
 The Lord Chancellor's Department has the lead responsibility for fine enforcement. Provisions for improving the collection of fines are already being dealt with in clauses 31, 89 and 90 and in schedule 2 of the Courts Bill. Those measures will establish a new framework for fine enforcement, including ways to obtain prompt payment, more severe sanctions for those who try to play the system, and a dedicated fines officer managing the collection of fines. The system will provide for discounts for prompt payers and increases for those who delay payment. I hope that the fact that the Government already have this matter in hand by virtue of the Courts Bill will encourage my hon. Friend to withdraw his amendment.

Dominic Grieve: At the risk of prolonging proceedings, I want to mention that I was interested in the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen), which seems very pertinent. A problem is that although we have touched, peripherally, on the issue of fines, we have not succeeded in holding a discrete debate, although it may be possible to do that on new clause 8. The amendment, which is designed to facilitate fine collection, raises the question of sanctions. It is interesting that we are moving towards a much more liberal regime of sanctions which will arguably make fine enforcement less easy. Equally, there are arguments for alternatives to the ultimate sanction of locking people up, and those should be tried as much as possible.
 I hope that the Government have this interesting and important issue in mind. I hope also that we shall consider it in more detail when we consider new clause 8. We want fines to work and we want the Home 
 Secretary to be able to make enforcement work. However, I fear that the issue has not been fully addressed yet.

Graham Allen: My apologies, Mr. Illsley, for not paying you the normal courtesy of welcoming you to the Chair.
 The Minister will be aware of the National Audit Office's reports on the poor level of fine collection in magistrates courts and I know that he takes it extremely seriously, as does Parliament. I have written to him about the possibility of incentivising courts to pick up additional fines. If they can do better than they do now, a percentage of the revenue should be kept within the purview of that court for use for local matters, many of which we have discussed, such as publicising its activities and making itself more user-friendly. I hope that the Minister will consider that. 
 Finally, as both Conservative and Labour Governments have looked at the impact of general management on education and on the health service, does the Minister feel that it is now time to have general managers for courts? They would not have a direct interest in the process of the courts, or the cases before them, but would be accountable either to the Minister or to the Lord Chancellor's Department. I do not expect a reply to that now, but I hope that the Minister will take it on board when he considers the pathetic number of fines that are paid appropriately to courts. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 937, in
clause 265, page 147, line 32, leave out subsection (4).

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 938, in
clause 265, page 148, line 4, leave out ', or' and insert ', Section 268(1), or'.

Simon Hughes: These amendments revisit familiar territory, so I shall not detain the Committee for long. They make a point and enable us to ask a couple of questions about the Government's intentions.
 Clause 265 is a general clause that gives Ministers the power to make rules by statutory instrument. That is normal and understandable. We are all used to it, and we have just debated an amendment that would have added a further opportunity to the two set out in clause 265(3). The first allows variations; it says that the power 
''may be exercised so as to make different provision for different purposes or different areas'',
 and the second, slightly delphically—perhaps it is a drafting convention—says that it 
''may be exercised either for all the purposes to which the power extends or for those purposes subject to specified exceptions, or only for specified purposes'',
 which covers all bases. Basically, it says that there is a wide-ranging set of alternatives available to Ministers, and there is nothing new about that. The question is how widespread or limited and tied to the Bill they should be. There is always a danger of clauses starting off too widely drawn. Happily, in the case of Home Office Bills in which I have been involved on behalf of 
 my party, we have managed, if not in this House then in the other place, to restrict such provisions. The object of amendment No. 937 is to probe whether the scope of subsection (4) can be reduced. At the moment it includes power to make 
''(a) any supplementary, incidental or consequential provision''—
 any. Supplementary provisions are, by definition, further down a waterfall than the main proposal and ''incidental'' allows one to get a bit further away, but ''consequential'' could be widely interpreted. 
 Those are not the worst aspects of the subsection, although they come within the famous Henry VIII definition. I have never checked those powers. It is one of those terms of art that have been used for a long time. It is entirely likely that Henry VIII did have such powers. He used extreme powers in his public and private life at every opportunity. A monarch who was willing to behead his wives and break with the Pope strikes me as being likely to push the powers to the limit. [Interruption.] I will be good, and not repeat the exchange that has just taken place. 
 Subsection (4)(b) is understandable as it refers to ''transitory, transitional or saving'' provisions. However, we then get the wide sweep provision, which is that the Minister making the order must consider it ''necessary or expedient''. Ministers sometimes consider things necessary or expedient in a way that may not command the unanimous support of the House, let alone of their party. 
 We had an important debate yesterday about certain Government policies that Ministers considered to be necessary and expedient, but the Government did not carry a substantial number of their own party with them, and they certainly did not have the support of the Liberal Democrats. I raise the matter because it strikes me that the provision gives Ministers too much power. I shall give an example. 
 If the Home Secretary of the day thought that a judge's interpretation of a provision in what will become the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was something that he did not wish for, he could, if he thought it necessary or expedient, bring forward an order to clarify the legislation. He could argue that it would be exercised in a way that was ''supplementary, incidental or consequential'' upon the Act, but that could go a long way. 
 I heard of an exchange in the House of Lords yesterday that included criticism of the Home Secretary's remarks on a High Court judgment in a case brought under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 about changes to the benefits law. The Home Secretary had suggested that the judge should not have behaved as he did; yet I have read the whole of the judgment given by Lord Justice Collins, and he was absolutely clear that his judgment was based on the law as he understood it and on what he thought Parliament meant by it, taking into account the other obligations imposed on him by other legislation, including the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 The danger is that the provision in subsection (4)(b) may be far too wide. The words ''or expedient'' are by 
 definition subjective, not objective; they are too wide and potentially dangerous. We should avoid such provisions unless they are tidying-up operations, or make a de minimis change—the sort of thing that comes to light when Ministers realise that an inconsistency in the drafting had not been spotted in Committee, an incompatibility between clauses or a repeal that had not been spotted. Such things are fine—a proper procedure is needed, but it should not detain Parliament—but there should not be such a wide sweep. 
 That is the reason for amendment No. 937. My instinct is to seek to divide the Committee, unless the Minister can reassure me, because we would resist such a wide definition. 
 Amendment No. 938 would simply add the provision that a statutory instrument made under the clause should go through only if it is approved by both Houses under the affirmative resolution procedure. That would give us the best control. That would add clause 268(1), the general sweep-up provisions, to the list in subsection (6) that should be dealt with under the affirmative resolution procedure. For those who are not Members or close followers of procedure, I should explain the importance of that. If the Government want to bring in something important, and if the Bill allows for secondary legislation, our view is that Parliament should none the less automatically have the chance to consider it. However, that does not mean that we detain Parliament unnecessarily. The reality is that if subsequent provisions are uncontroversial, they go through on the nod—they are on the Order Paper and no one objects to them. Ministers know well that a Committee can consider several uncontroversial statutory instruments together. We do not have an over-laborious, over-complicated and time-consuming system, so there is not a danger to parliamentary business management or other things. 
 We usually consider such important matters and the proper role of Parliament at the end of a Committee. However, I should be grateful to hear the Minister's general response and what things he envisages would be governed by the provisions both in the clause, in particular in subsection (4), and in clause 268(1).

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. I do not want to repeat his arguments, but it is worth while for the Committee to pause to consider for a moment how the system that is projected by the provisions in their unamended form works in practice.
 In the last Parliament, it was my interesting lot—some would say unhappy lot—to serve on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which is one of those Committees that most people who join want to get off as quickly as possible. They are probably mistaken, because seeing how Henry VIII clauses and statutory instruments are generally managed is an educational experience. 
 The key question—the hon. Gentleman mentioned this—is whether the power that the Minister is being granted is used in one of two ways that are objectionable. The first way would be for the power 
 to be used more widely than anticipated, although I expect that the Minister will reassure us that he intends the provision to have quite a narrow scope. The second way covers those instances in which the Minister seeks to use powers wider than those that are in fact conferred. When I served on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments there were quite a few occasions on which Speaker's Counsel came along to advise the Committee and said that he had anxieties about the vires of a proposed statutory instrument, because he had read the enabling legislation and the SI, and had found the two difficult to reconcile. 
 Far from being able to intervene in that process, Parliament finds that what I describe is the end of the matter. One writes off to the Department concerned and says, ''We question whether in fact this statutory instrument is within the powers conferred by the legislation,'' and the departmental advisers to the Minister write back and say, ''We disagree with you.'' At that point Parliament's role is effectively at an end, and it is left to the judiciary to pick up the pieces of any subsequent dispute and decide whether the Minister has acted within his powers. That is why, as a matter of principle, I, like the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), am always worried by the conferring of wide powers to amend legislation. I appreciate that there is provision to attempt to reverse such things through a negative resolution—not an affirmative provision. However, negative resolutions do not attract much attention or publicity, and they tend to be a foregone conclusion, despite one or two rare exceptions. The matter always causes me anxiety. 
 I should be interested to hear from the Minister, for Hansard purposes, exactly what he anticipates that the scope of the provisions will be, and examples of incidents in which he expects them to be applied. That would be very helpful, and it is one reason why the matter must be dealt with by a probing amendment so that we have a record of the intention behind the clause. I worry about the word ''expedient'', although it may simply be a standard phrase. However, ''expediency'' in ordinary English usage has a rather nasty connotation. It would seem to allow a very wide use of powers. I hope that the Minister can reassure us on the meaning of the word. I accept that it would be impossible to govern the country without statutory instruments; however, it was possible to do so in the 1960s when 30 were introduced per annum. I do not know the latest figure, but I believe that when I left the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments at the last election we were nudging the 4,000 mark. That is the extent to which this country is now governed by subordinate orders and legislation.

Hilary Benn: As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, being familiar territory does not make this unimportant territory. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to the points that were raised. First, I understand that the word ''expedient'' is the standard phrase used in such drafting; it has no hidden meanings. It is also applied elsewhere.
 Of course I recognise that the power is wide. There is a balance to be struck between effective parliamentary scrutiny and the best use of parliamentary time. I am sure that all hon. Members recognise that, and indeed the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) recognised it in his remarks. In this instance, we believe that such a degree of parliamentary scrutiny would be disproportionate, given the nature of the likely supplementary, incidental and consequential provisions required. All hon. Members would accept that in a Bill of such scale and complexity there is a need for, in the words of clause 265(4)(b), a 
''transitory, transitional or saving provision''.
 That applies particularly to those provisions in the Bill that would need to be piloted and phased in. 
 The Committee that considers such matters has taken a particular interest in the issue, and hon. Members will, I am sure, be aware of the third special report of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in the current session. They are called ''Henry VIII powers'' in common parlance, but given the description that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey gave the Committee of how that monarch used his powers, anything that Ministers might seek to do under these provisions would be modest in comparison.

David Heath: Does the Minister recognise the possibility of the Henry VIII in Queen Anne's gate colliding with the self-proclaimed Cardinal Wolsey on the Woolsack on the matter?

Hilary Benn: I can only say that I know of no such Henry VIII in Queen Anne's gate. We shall move on.
 The report said: 
''We have no doubt, however, that there are occasions when Henry VIII powers to make incidental, consequential and similar provision are justified: for example, when the number of incidental, consequential etc. amendments would cause a disproportionate increase in the length of a bill or when, as a matter of practicality, it would be difficult to anticipate the full extent of such amendments during the passage of a bill.''
 That, in essence, is why the provisions are included. The truth, as hon. Members will be aware, is that, given the scale and complexity of the Bill and the process that we went through in Committee, we may miss some things in order to give effect to the principles and to the clauses. Therefore it is sensible to have this provision. 
 It is also worth saying that the report found: 
''We recognise that in some instances the negative procedure provides a sufficient level of Parliamentary scrutiny.''
 Clause 265(5) sets out clearly the powers that must be exercised by statutory instrument by the affirmative resolution procedure; all others are set out in subsection (6), subject to the provisions of subsection (7). 
 It may reassure members of the Committee if I give an example of what those references in the Bill refer to where neither the affirmative nor negative resolution procedure applies. For example, clause 195(3) would enable description of a person responsible for monitoring where a relevant order includes an electronic monitoring requirement. A change of that 
 description is one example where we think that it is appropriate to deal with statutory instruments in the way in which it is set out here. 
 In response to what the third special report said about the balance between the affirmative and the negative resolution procedures, it may be helpful to say that the Committee said that 
''reasons for any departure from affirmative procedure should be set out in full in the Explanatory Notes accompanying a bill and in the memorandum submitted to this Committee.''
 As the Bill passes to the other place, a memorandum will need to be submitted to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee setting out the delegated powers sought in the Bill and the justification for seeking them. It is intended that the memorandum should set out where we think that the negative resolution procedure offers an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny for those orders. The report was issued during the passage of the Bill, and we are keen to respond to it when we have had a chance to consider it.

Simon Hughes: First, I should be grateful if the Minister would deal specifically with amendment No. 938. Rather than dealing with the generality, it seeks to bring into clause 265(5) the list of the sections where supplementary legislation would require affirmative procedure under clause 268(1). I appreciate that the Minister touched on that point incidentally.
 There is a point about drafting that I would like explained now to save us debating it when we come to clause stand part. I do not understand the interrelationship of subsections (5), (6) and (7). I understand that subsection (5)(a) and (b) set out those statutory instruments that require affirmative resolution. I also understand that subsection (6) effectively provides that any other statutory instrument shall be subject to negative resolution procedure. 
 Then, slightly confusingly, the clause provides that anything else that has a negative procedure does not apply to a statutory instrument containing only an order made under one of the five sections on the list. A simple reading of the clause did not tell me, and will not tell the reader, whether that means that a statutory instrument goes back to being subject to affirmative resolution or does not have any requirement at all. I presume that it is the latter; that there are a few statutory instruments that do not have to go back to Parliament and that are effectively opted out of further parliamentary scrutiny. I should be grateful for further clarification on that. 
 The Minister quoted the Joint Committee report. I was conscious that that Committee had been asked to consider that issue, but I own up to not having read the report. I was unaware that it had been published, which was a failure on my part and one to which I plead guilty. 
 At the end of the last Session, the House of Lords was debating Home Office business. There was considerable concern about that issue, which partly 
 triggered the wider reference back to the Joint Committee for specific deliberation. I have not been able to check this, but the Minister may be able to tell us whether the House of Lords has had a chance to debate the report to which he referred. Although we reflected the concerns in our House—as the Conservatives did equally—it is clearly in the Lords where the combined power of our parties is greater, relative to the Government's, leading to a greater ability to require that the matter be reconsidered. There was general concern in the Lords, not limited to our parties but stretching also across the Cross Benches into the Labour party, that it was necessary to get a grip on the wording and not to presume that the formulation that had always been used was all right. Different wording might be necessary and care would be needed to avoid subjectivity. I think that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and I agree about that and have made the point in our different ways. 
 I should like the Minister to clarify his view of amendment No. 938, and to confirm whether my understanding of subsection (7) is right. Is it normal for big Bills to allow a few instances of a supplementary legislative process that does not require a return to Parliament? Could the Minister also bring us up to speed on whether anyone other than the Committee—particularly in the House of Lords—has examined and approved the general view of the Joint Committee about whether safeguards exist? 
 I appreciate that this is not entirely a matter for the Minister's Department, but do the Government have a view, given that this will be relevant whoever is in government, on whether consensus may be sought between the parties on an acceptable wording—and possibly a different one, depending on what we intend to provide for, and in what piece of legislation? Agreement on that issue, which arises in relation to all major Bills, would be worth achieving.

Hilary Benn: I hope that I did address the central argument of amendment No. 938 when I said that in the Government's view there was a balance to be struck between affirmative and negative procedures, and what I shall describe not as the third way procedure—

Dominic Grieve: The non-procedure.

Hilary Benn: That is one way of putting it. I can confirm that subsection (7) refers to a statutory instrument being laid without further procedure; I think that that is probably the best description. However, I hope that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey will be reassured when I tell him that that approach is closely confined to the provisions listed in subsection (7). I provided an example earlier. The relevant circumstances are very limited ones in which it would not, frankly, be sensible to use either of the two aforementioned procedures to make the changes.

Dominic Grieve: In fairness to the Minister, I think that he is right to say that such an order would still go before the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. We used to spend a great deal of time examining them, although I am not sure to what purpose. Nevertheless,
 procedure was involved to the extent that they passed before our eyes and were occasionally commented on.

Hilary Benn: I am deeply reassured to hear that that is so.

Vera Baird: I am not sure whether this is quite the apposite moment, but I was looking through the provisions listed in subsection (7), which my hon. Friend has said will not return to the Floor of the House, to see whether any of them contained grave and weighty matters. I had reached section 262(6)(i) in the list, but I cannot find it.

Hilary Benn: My hon. and learned Friend has used her eagle eye. It may help her to know that we, too, had spotted that. We shall correct it this morning or this afternoon, depending on our rate of progress.

Vera Baird: Is it supposed to be section 262(7)? That would seem to be the likely alternative.

Hilary Benn: It should be subsection (6)(h).
 In answer to the other point raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, I do not know whether the other place has given the matter further consideration, but I will endeavour to find out. 
 In a broader sense, this is really a matter for others. That said, we debated the affirmative and negative resolution procedures when we considered amendments to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at the beginning of the Bill—that seems so long ago. As those debates made clear, it makes sense for the House to continue to reflect on how to strike the right balance between ensuring effective parliamentary scrutiny and giving practical effect to provisions that have been debated and agreed. In that way, consequentials and the other bits and pieces that, as all hon. Members recognise, arise from time to time can be dealt with in the most efficient way.

Simon Hughes: First, congratulations to the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). I gave up two lines before her, so I completely failed in my duty to scrutinise every line of the Government's proposals, although I did satisfy myself about the general point before I gave up. We are grateful to her, and we look forward to the opportunities that the Minister has presented.
 I understand the Government's position. We are always nervous about such issues, and we have not yet had a chance to ask our colleagues in the House of Lords—it was they who raised particular concerns—whether they are satisfied. I will therefore seek to divide the Committee on the amendment, which would provide a mechanism for protecting Parliament's rights. 
 I hope that there is a basis for negotiation. In that way, the parties and others may arrive at an agreement that gives us what the Minister seeks—the best balance between impractical politics and the legislative process on the one hand and attempts to hold the Executive to account on the other. I hope that the Committee will understand and that other hon. Members will join us, because this is an important matter. Ultimately, it is about ensuring that Parliament allows through only 
 those measures that have been dealt with under the proper process. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 676, in
clause 265, page 147, leave out line 40.
 In a sense, the amendment is the reverse of what went before. It would remove section 139 from the affirmative resolution procedure. That is not my intention: this is a probing amendment designed to highlight the way in which we propose changes in respect of the sentencing powers of the magistrates court. Although we have already discussed that, I wish to register my continuing anxiety. 
 Section 139 is the power of the Home Secretary to increase limits for the magistrates court by order at some subsequent date from 12 to 18 months and to substitute for the reference to 65 weeks in section 133 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 a reference to 24 months. We debated that in the context of an earlier part of the Bill, but I cannot let the matter pass without continuing to express my concern about how we are going about it. 
 We already know that it is the plan to increase the sentencing power to 12 months without there being in place the custody plus and custody minus element, which will be very important in determining the number of people in the prison population. Here, we give the Minister, by order, a power to raise it yet again—not something that I necessarily disagree with—without our having the opportunity to debate the consequences. I do not want to see a negative resolution, but I worry about whether an affirmative procedure is satisfactory for what will be a very important change, if and when he decides to bring it in. 
 I hope that the Home Affairs Committee will have an opportunity to consider and scrutinise the measure, and that the Government will publish a paper explaining how it will work in practice and how it will affect the prison population. Otherwise, we are in danger of bringing about a substantial change in sentencing procedure at some indeterminate time, by order, on a short debate in the House or in Committee. It bothers me very much that we should leave as a hostage to fortune for a future date something that could have profound consequences for the way in which the prison system is operated. 
 Will the Minister consider the fact that we do not know whether the power to increase limits might be invoked next year, the year after or in five or 10 years' time? The House has not the slightest idea what the 
 crime rate will be then, what the prison population and the pressures on it will be, or whether there will have been adequate review of the decision that we have taken to raise sentencing limits for magistrates courts. There is a danger—I say this in all sincerity—that we shall take a decision on insufficient evidence, when a decision of such magnitude probably calls for separate legislation in a short Bill. I have no desire to see this removed into negative procedure, but I am not happy with it where it is. I do not want the Bill to leave the Committee without expressing my deep concern that we should be doing this in this way, and leaving a power to a subsequent Home Secretary—who could be Labour or Conservative—

Simon Hughes: Could be Liberal Democrat, too.

Dominic Grieve: That, I have to say to the hon. Gentleman, is very wild speculation. Nevertheless, whoever the Home Secretary might be and of whatever party he—[Hon. Members: ''Or she'']—or she might be, I am reluctant to see him or her entrusted with such a power, because I do not think that Parliament will be able to exercise its proper scrutiny and to have an influence if it thinks that that is the wrong time to make such an order, or that the order should not be made at all. Those are my objections.

David Heath: I support the hon. Gentleman's contention, and I do so in the context of our rapidly growing prison population. Figures released by the Home Office yesterday show that the UK now jails a higher proportion of its citizens than any other country in western Europe. We have now overtaken Portugal in that respect, and even jail more of our citizens than Libya or Malaysia. Some 72,144 of our citizens are in prison this week. The average sentence for adults has increased by five months to two years and two months. We have a burgeoning prison population. However, in clauses 137 and 138 the Government have already provided for the biggest increase in sentencing powers for magistrates courts that we have seen for a long time. Clause 139 goes beyond that and provides for powers to give further increases, without recourse to a proper debate or any satisfactory analysis of the consequences of the implementation of clauses 137 and 138.
 I have to agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield: I do not think that that is a satisfactory arrangement. We are, to an extent, debating the matter after the horse has bolted. We have already touched on the matter, and this point in the Bill is our last chance in the Committee to raise a serious concern. I agree that the amendment is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with the matter, in that it would take things further away from parliamentary scrutiny, but it underlines, I hope, a serious point, which is that the matter should not be dealt with by order or with only casual consideration either by Ministers or by the House. It merits detailed and considered debate on the basis of evidence. We talk so often about evidence-based law making, but I am not satisfied that the process envisaged under the Bill will provide for that. 
 I do not think that the Bill is satisfactory as it stands, and I suspect that colleagues in another place will find it even more unsatisfactory. I hope that the Minister will at least try to satisfy the Committee of the rightness of the path that he has chosen. However, it would be better still to reconsider the matter and perhaps find an alternative way of introducing further proposals at a later stage if he feels that those would be necessary, rather than renewing primary legislation. We all feel that that would be the most appropriate way of dealing with the issue.

Hilary Benn: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for pointing out the technical deficiency in the amendment. However, that does not detract from the force of the point that he made, which we have debated at some length before. I have reflected on those debates, and although I recognise that some members of the Committee felt strongly about the matter, I do not recollect strong objections to the principle of revisiting the upper limits. That is an important consideration to bear in mind.
 I shall quickly recap the argument. There is no evidence that magistrates' sentences are more severe than those of the Crown court. It is important that we hold on to that fact. I would not want anyone to have the impression that making use of the power contained in the clause to increase magistrates' sentencing powers further—to 18 months' custody in respect of one offence and 24 months' custody in respect of two or more offences to be served consecutively—would be done in a casual manner. 
 I accept entirely the argument about the need to reflect on the impact of the changes that the Bill would make, and the fact that we should consider all the issues referred to by the hon. Members for Beaconsfield and for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), before the Home Secretary can decide whether it would be sensible to use the powers in the Bill further to increase those sentencing powers. In other words, we will have to evaluate it properly and consider the evidence in order to see what the impact it will have before a future Home Secretary can decide whether it is sensible to extend the sentencing powers of magistrates. 
 Once that has been done, it should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure—although some may take a different view. In the light of our debate about the principle, and the fact that there has been no objection to the possibility of further extension—I think that I am right in saying that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield indicated assent to that argument—I do not think that the affirmative resolution procedure is an inappropriate way to do it. However, I acknowledge that it will be a significant step and that it will have to be done on the basis of evidence and proper evaluation.

David Heath: For the avoidance of doubt, and because I do not think that the Minister was trying to misrepresent the points put earlier in the debate, we have indicated that we are prepared to accept the provision for 12 months. However, we have not said at any stage that we would accept an extension of that
 without the most rigorous examination. We believe that it would take some time to adduce the necessary evidence, and among other things we would need to consider it in the context of the criminal justice and penal system as a whole. That will take years, not months, so we are talking about some distance in the future.
 I shall have doubts then about making a further substantial change to sentencing policy by order rather than primary legislation. It may be 10 years ahead from the Bill's enactment, but it is a significant change in sentencing powers. It is something that should be properly considered by the House. The right way of doing that is through primary legislation, not by slipping in a provision of this kind into the Bill, as a sort of delayed-action power that can be invoked at some stage in the future. We clearly disagree with the Government. I suspect that we agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, but he can speak for himself.

Dominic Grieve: I do indeed agree with the hon. Gentleman. Our position has always been that we would be prepared to consider it. We certainly did not stand in the way of the increase to 12 months—indeed, we welcomed it, accepting that it should be open to review. However, it is vastly premature to decide now that it would be correct to go for a further extension, although the Minister has reassured me to an extent by acknowledging that no such step could be taken without a great deal of consultation and scrutiny. The difficulty is that the proper mechanism for scrutiny is the passing of legislation by the House—even a short Bill. Second Reading would give hon. Members the opportunity to express their views on the principle, and in Committee and on Report, they might come up with alternative figures—for example, 15 months rather than 18 months. There are all sorts of possibilities, but they are not included in the Bill, although there appears to be at least an intention by the Government that they wish to do that at some point in the future.
 I find the situation profoundly unsatisfactory.

David Heath: It is not as though the Home Office normally has a lack of legislative opportunities. Not many years go by without a Criminal Justice Bill or something similar being passed as a vehicle for such change. The Home Office does not have the difficulty that some Departments might have of finding an appropriate legislative principle; they happen all the time, like a queue of buses.

Dominic Grieve: I know that the Home Secretary hopes that this defining Criminal Justice Bill will lessen the need for future such Bills. However, if I were a betting man, I would speculate that we will have another such Bill in some form or other within the next two years.

David Heath: Exactly.

Mark Francois: I cannot wait.

Dominic Grieve: I am glad to hear that, but I am not sure that I put myself into the same category as my hon. Friend. I seem to have been very absorbed in Bills of a criminal nature over the past two years, and a short break might be quite in order. The fact is that the
 clause is unsatisfactory, but I will not press the amendment to a vote. I do not know what will be done there about this, but if I were in the other place I would take out clause 139. I do not think that it should be in the Bill in its current form. The Government should be willing to accept that such a further change should be introduced only through primary legislation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendments made: No. 753, in 
clause 265, page 148, line 3, at end insert— 
 'section (Fine defaulters: driving disqualification)(5),'.
 No. 754, in 
clause 265, page 148, line 4, after '262(7),' insert— 
 'paragraph 5 of Schedule (Default orders: modification of provisions relating to community orders),'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 965, in
clause 265, page 148, line 16, leave out 'section 262(6)(i)' and insert 'section 262(6)(h)'.
 This is indeed the amendment that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) spotted in her contribution. I am therefore sure that the Committee will pass it with acclaim.

Dominic Grieve: I do not wish to be too contrary, but it was a subject of intrigued speculation for me as to how clause 262(6)(i) got muddled up with clause 262(6)(h). Someone may have typed the wrong key or it may have been originally intended to have a clause 262(6)(i), which was deleted at some point. Can the Minister enlighten us as to what actually happened?
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: We have indicated our concerns about this clause and clause 268. I want to make one constructive suggestion and then confirm our position, which is that I anticipate that we will not win an argument today to amend the clause in a way in that we would be happy with. I will flag up opposition without seeking to divide the Committee further on that point. It is a matter that we may want to come back to downstairs, and we may want to pursue it even more vigorously in the House of Lords. I do not think that it is a secret that I, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and others will work to get an agreed position. If we can agree it with the Government, so much the better; if we cannot, we may have to defeat them.
 On the constructive suggestion, will the Minister be so kind as to ask those responsible for drafting to look at whether the separation of clause 265 and 268 is as logical as they think, as 265 is the general power and 268 the power that deals with amendments necessary to bring other legislation into line? There may be a tidier arrangement than having two separate places with cross-references to clauses all over the place. 
 I see that we are about to discuss amendments Nos. 1005 to 1017; I do not remember being on a Committee in which the amendments ran into four figures. I do not object to so many amendments—Bills are here to be amended and improved, and that is a 
 good thing. However, if we can make them as short as possible we shall have improved them. There must be a shorter and tidier way of doing this. Some of us on the Committee will not be happy to let the Bill go through with this clause unamended, and we will take the appropriate action.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman is right. The fact that I did not vote on amendment No. 937 did not mean that I was not concerned. I was unsure whether it was sensible to divide the Committee at that point. It did not denote indifference to an extremely important issue.

Hilary Benn: I am happy to reflect on the point that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey made about the relationship between clauses 265 and 268.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 265, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 266 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 25 - Further minor and consequential amendments

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 44, in
schedule 25, page 274, line 35, at end insert— 
 '(1A) In subsection (1)(g) after ''examination)'' there is inserted '', section 52(5) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (adjournment of proceedings under section 51 etc)''.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 47 and 48.

Hilary Benn: These are very minor tidying up amendments, which, I should explain to hon. Members, were not included in the letter that I sent to them. Amendment No. 44 makes a consequential amendment to the Supreme Court Act 1981, adding a reference to adjournment under section 52(5) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This is a missed consequential: it is consequential not on this Bill but on a provision in the 1998 Act that was overlooked at the time of enactment. We are tidying up after the event.
 Amendments Nos. 47 and 48 remove a redundant reference from section 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, which deals with the power of the High Court to grant or vary bail, and which clause 14 of this Bill amends. The reference is redundant because it could never apply in the circumstances in which section 22, as amended, would operate. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 45, in 
schedule 25, page 274, line 38, leave out 'or'.
 No. 46, in 
schedule 25, page 274, line 38, at end insert— 
 '(2A) In subsection (1)(g) after subparagraph (iii) there is inserted ''or 
 (iiia) section 24C (intention as to plea by child or young person: adjournment);''.' 
 —[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 957, in
schedule 25, page 274, line 38, at end insert— 
 Charging etc 
 Criminal Law Act 1977 (c.45)
2A In section 39 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (service of summons and citation throughout United Kingdom) for subsection (1) there is substituted— 
 ''(1) The following documents, namely— 
 (a) a summons requiring a person charged with an offence to appear before a court in England or Wales, 
 (b) a written charge (within the meaning of section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) charging a person with an offence, 
 (c) a requisition (within the meaning of that section) requiring a person charged with an offence to appear before a court in England or Wales, and 
 (d) any other document which, by virtue of any enactment, may or must be served on a person with, or at the same time as, a document mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) above, 
 may, in such manner as may be prescribed by rules of court, be served on him in Scotland or Northern Ireland.'' 
 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c.43) 
 2B The Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 is amended as follows. 
 2C (1) Section 1 (issue of summons to accused or warrant for his arrest) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (3) after ''section'' there is inserted ''upon an information being laid''. 
 (3) In subsection (4) after ''summons'' there is inserted '', or a written charge and requisition,''. 
 (4) In subsection (6) after ''has'' there is inserted '', or a written charge and requisition have,''. 
 (5) After subsection (6) there is inserted— 
 ''(6A) Where the offence charged is an indictable offence and a written charge and requisition have previously been issued, a warrant may be issued under this section by a justice of the peace upon a copy of the written charge (rather than an information) being laid before the justice by a public prosecutor.'' 
 (6) After subsection (7) there is inserted— 
 ''(7A) For the purposes of subsection (6A) above, a copy of a written charge may be laid before, and a warrant under this section may be issued by, a single justice of the peace.'' 
 2D In section 150(1) (interpretation of other terms) after the definition of ''prescribed'' there is inserted— 
 '' ''public prosecutor'', ''requisition'' and ''written charge'' have the same meaning as in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;'' 
 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (c.23) 
 2E (1) Section 15 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (interpretation) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (1) after the definition of ''public authority'' there is inserted— 
 '' ''public prosecutor'', ''requisition'' and ''written charge'' have the same meaning as in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;''. 
 (3) In subsection (2), after paragraph (b) there is inserted— 
 ''(ba) where a public prosecutor issues a written charge and requisition for the offence, when the written charge and requisition are issued;''. 
 Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 (c.5) 
 2F In section 2(1) of the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 (service of United Kingdom process overseas) after paragraph (a) there is inserted— 
 ''(aa) a written charge and requisition (within the meaning of section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) charging a person with an offence and requiring that person to appear before a court in England and Wales; and''. 
 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c.33) 
 2G (1) Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (intimidation, etc, of witnesses, jurors and others) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (9), for the word ''and'' at the end of the definition of ''potential'' there is substituted— 
 '' ''public prosecutor'', ''requisition'' and ''written charge'' have the same meaning as in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;''. 
 (3) In subsection (10)(a), after subparagraph (i) there is inserted— 
 ''(ia) when a public prosecutor issues a written charge and requisition in respect of the offence;''. 
 Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (c.37) 
 2H (1) Section 60 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (prosecution by order of Commissioners of Customs and Excise) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (6) for the word ''and'' at the end of the definition of ''officer'' there is substituted— 
 '' ''public prosecutor'', ''requisition'' and ''written charge'' have the same meaning as in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;''. 
 (3) In subsection (6A), after paragraph (a) there is inserted— 
 ''(aa) when a public prosecutor issues a written charge and requisition in respect of the offence;''. 
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (c.21) 
 2I (1) Section 145 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (interpretation of section 144) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (2)(a), after subparagraph (i) there is inserted— 
 ''(ia) when a public prosecutor issues a written charge and requisition in respect of the offence;''. 
 (3) After subsection (2) there is inserted— 
 ''(2A) In subsection (2) above ''public prosecutor'', ''requisition'' and ''written charge'' have the same meaning as in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.'' 
 Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11) 
 2J (1) Paragraph 11 of Schedule 4 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (proceedings for an offence: timing) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subparagraph (1), after paragraph (a) there is inserted— 
 ''(aa) when a public prosecutor issues a written charge and requisition in respect of the offence;''. 
 (3) After subparagraph (2) there is inserted— 
 ''(2A) In subparagraph (1) ''public prosecutor'', ''requisition'' and ''written charge'' have the same meaning as in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.'' 
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c.29) 
 2K (1) Section 85 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (proceedings) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (1), after paragraph (a) there is inserted— 
 ''(aa) when a public prosecutor issues a written charge and requisition in respect of the offence;''. 
 (3) After subsection (8) there is inserted— 
 ''(9) In this section ''public prosecutor'', ''requisition'' and ''written charge'' have the same meaning as in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.''.'.
 This amendment adds to schedule 25 some minor amendments that are consequential on part 4 and deal with charging. Despite their length, they amend various statutory references to the laying of an information or the issuing of a summons to take account of the new procedure under clause 24 whereby a public prosecutor or, in certain circumstances, the police, instead of laying an information to obtain the issue of a summons, will issue a written charge accompanied by a requisition. That is a change that we debated and agreed.

Dominic Grieve: We have not debated it. We have not touched on it at any point. It was one of the things that caused me particular anxiety, because it constitutes a profound change, and I tabled some probing amendments, but we never reached them. I have to say to the Minister that that was due to the timetable.

Hilary Benn: I am duly corrected, and I apologise. However, in its wisdom, the Committee approved the clauses. The amendments that will be consequential on the provisions are minor ones.

Dominic Grieve: I am conscious that I must be careful or I shall be ruled out of order. Although the text is highly technical, it cross-references to an issue that the Committee has not so far had the opportunity to consider at all and that, although apparently innocuous, raises a number of important issues. I do not know how much the Minister might be able to help me if I use this as my guideline and keep myself in order. He looks unhappy, I suspect because his notes, written with reference to the original clause, which we never debated, are long consigned to the dustbin.
 The issue is narrow. The Minister says that this is about replacing the system of laying of information with the system of issuing written charges. The big distinction that arises, or could do, is that the old system required information to be laid on oath. Police officers had to go before magistrates and take an oath that the information was correct. The new system specifically precludes the need to do that. It is a technical issue, because generally such things go through on the nod. However, under the old system, officers attending in order to issue summonses and lay information rendered themselves liable to prosecution for perjury if they acted maliciously and laid it on insufficient grounds that they knew to be untrue, whereas I am not sure that that applies under the new system. 
 The new system is an administrative form of rubber-stamping. That is a significant change, and it is unfortunate that my hopes that it would be debated in Committee have not been realised. Now, seeing that we have an amendment that refers to the matter—I think that I have kept myself in order throughout the process—I should like to raise it with the Minister. He might find that he has speaking notes, because I tabled amendments, which are on the record—this is not ex improviso. Alternatively, he might care to write me a long letter long before Report so that, if I find his answer unsatisfactory, I can do something about it.

Hilary Benn: I will gladly write the hon. Gentleman the letter that he requests.

Dominic Grieve: On that basis, I cannot take the matter any further; I have put it on the record. I do not have my speaking notes with me, but I remember clearly drafting the amendments in the hope that we should be able to discuss them. Perhaps I should not say this until the end of our proceedings in Committee, but although the Government Whip has been most helpful and we have done our best, it is slightly regrettable that we have still not been able to scrutinise some of the provisions, and this is one of them.

Simon Hughes: I endorse what the hon. Gentleman says about the Government Whip and the Minister. We are grateful to them and to the Solicitor-General for their co-operation, and no criticism of them is meant. I am also grateful to the Minister for very punctual correspondence about matters that have been raised, and I should like him to pass on thanks to those who assisted him. The only defect has been the inability to debate some provisions. We have tried; the failure is not for want of trying to reach the right balance. However, it is highly unsatisfactory that we have not done that when considering a Bill that deals with whether people are criminals or not.
 The Liberal Democrats requested a significant amount of time on Report—the Conservatives or the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) may well have asked for that too—and I understand that that has found favour with the Government, for which I am grateful. That will give us some comfort. Rather than repeating a point, and on the understanding that the present thinking of Government business managers is that there will be two full days for Report, which is a consolation—although I know that the arrangement is provisional—my hon. Friend and I will work with other members of the Committee and their colleagues to achieve the right balance and to isolate matters that we have not yet been able to debate. In that way we may be able to share out time reasonably on matters of concern, to obtain the maximum opportunity for debate. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 1005, in
schedule 25, page 276, line 34, at end insert— 
 'Indictments Act 1915 (c.90) 
 24A (1) Section 5 of the Indictments Act 1915 (orders for amendment of indictment, separate trial and postponement of trial) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (5)(a) for ''are to'' there is substituted ''(if there is one)''. 
 (3) In subsection (5)(b) after ''discharged'' there is inserted ''under paragraph (a)''. 
 Criminal Law Act 1967 (c.58) 
 24B In section 6(4) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (trial of offences) after ''jury'' there is inserted ''or otherwise act''. 
 Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) 
 24C In section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (entry of verdict of not guilty by order of a judge)— 
 (a) for ''the defendant being given in charge to a jury'' there is substituted ''any further steps being taken in the proceedings'', and 
 (b) after ''verdict of a jury'' there is inserted ''or a court''. 
 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (c.19) 
 24D In section 7(2)(c) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (power to order retrial)— 
 (a) for ''the jury were discharged from giving a verdict'' there is substituted ''no verdict was given'', and 
 (b) for ''convicting him'' there is substituted ''his being convicted''.'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 1006 to 1017.

Hilary Benn: Amendments Nos. 1005 to 1017 are minor and consequential amendments to references to
 the jury in existing legislation. One of my many missives to members of the Committee was to tell them in general terms about the changes.
 Clause 42(4) makes consequential provision on a very general basis for statutory references to a jury or a jury's verdict or finding to be construed as references to a court, except where the context requires otherwise. In essence, where there is provision in the Bill for trial without jury, consequential changes need to be made to various items of legislation to ensure that they are fully consistent with the provisions that we have considered. 
 The clause is adapted from section 75(3) of the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides for trials by judge alone in Northern Ireland. We are confident that that general provision, which has apparently worked well in Northern Ireland for several years, will achieve the right result and make the relevant statute law work satisfactorily at a technical level for trials on indictment both with and without juries. However, for the avoidance of doubt, we are making consequential provision in a limited number of cases in which we cannot be sure that the combination of an existing statutory provision and clause 42(4) will produce the right result. That is the purpose of the amendments, which I appreciate are quite lengthy. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 1006, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 4, at end insert— 
 'Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c.60) 
 25A (1) Section 77 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (confessions of mentally handicapped persons) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (1) after ''indictment'' there is inserted ''with a jury''. 
 (3) In subsection (2) after ''indictment'' there is inserted ''with a jury''. 
 (4) After subsection (2) there is inserted— 
 ''(2A) In any case where at the trial on indictment without a jury of a person for an offence it appears to the court that a warning under subsection (1) above would be required if the trial were with a jury, the court shall treat the case as one in which there is a special need for caution before convicting the accused on his confession.''.'. 
 No. 1007, in 
 schedule 25, page 277, line 5, at end insert— 
 '25B The Criminal Justice Act 1987 is amended as follows.'.
 No. 1008, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 6, leave out 
 'of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (c.38)'.
 No. 1009, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 14, at end insert— 
 '26A (1) Section 9 (the preparatory hearing) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (4)(b) for ''the jury'' there is substituted ''a jury''. 
 (3) In subsection (13) for ''no jury shall be sworn'' there is substituted ''the preparatory hearing shall not be concluded''. 
 26B (1) Section 10 (later stages of trial) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (2) after ''jury'' there is inserted ''or, in the case of a trial without a jury, the judge''. 
 (3) In subsection (3) for ''deciding whether to give leave'' there is substituted ''doing anything under subsection (2) above or in deciding whether to do anything under it''. 
 (4) In subsection (4) for ''Except as provided by this section'' there is substituted ''Except as provided by this section, in the case of a trial with a jury''.'.
 No. 1010, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 15, at end insert— 
 '26C The Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 is amended as follows. 
 26D In section 7A(6)(a) (powers of non-legal staff) for ''by a jury'' there is substituted ''on indictment''.'.
 No. 1011, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 16, leave out 
 'of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (c.23)'.
 No. 1012, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 28, at end insert— 
 'Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c.33) 
 27A The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows. 
 27B In section 35(2) (effect of accused's silence at trial) after ''indictment'' there is inserted ''with a jury''. 
 27C In section 51(10)(b) (intimidation of witnesses, jurors and others) after ''finding'' there is inserted ''otherwise than in circumstances where the proceedings are continued without a jury''.'.
 No. 1013, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 29, at end insert— 
 '27D The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is amended as follows.'.
 No. 1014, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 30, leave out 
 'of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (c.25)'.
 No. 1015, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 38, at end insert— 
 '28A In section 31(4)(b) (the preparatory hearing) for ''the jury'' there is substituted ''a jury''. 
 28B (1) Section 34 (later stages of trial) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (2) after ''jury'' there is inserted ''or, in the case of a trial without a jury, the judge''. 
 (3) In subsection (3) for ''deciding whether to give leave'' there is substituted ''doing anything under subsection (2) or in deciding whether to do anything under it''. 
 (4) In subsection (4) for ''Except as provided by this section'' there is substituted ''Except as provided by this section, in the case of a trial with a jury''. 
 28C In section 35(2) (appeals to Court of Appeal) for ''no jury shall be sworn'' there is substituted ''the preparatory hearing shall not be concluded''. 
 28D In section 36(2) (appeals to House of Lords) for ''no jury shall be sworn'' there is substituted ''the preparatory hearing shall not be concluded''.'.
 No. 1016, in 
schedule 25, page 277, line 39, leave out 'of that Act'.
 No. 1017, in 
schedule 25, page 278, line 7, at end insert— 
 'Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) 
 29A In paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (applications for dismissal) for ''a jury properly to convict him'' there is substituted ''him to be properly convicted''. 
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (c.23) 
 29B The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows. 
 29C In section 32 (warning to jury) after ''indictment'' there is inserted ''with a jury''. 
 29D In section 39(1) (warning to jury) after ''indictment'' there is inserted ''with a jury''. 
 Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c.24) 
 29E In paragraph 19(6)(c) of Schedule 1 to the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (general interpretation) after ''finding'' there is inserted ''otherwise than in circumstances where the proceedings are continued without a jury''. 
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c.29) 
 29F In section 316(9)(c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (general interpretation) after ''finding'' there is inserted ''otherwise than in circumstances where the proceedings are continued without a jury''.'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 958, in
schedule 25, page 278, line 27, at end insert— 
 'Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (c.47) 
 32A (1) Section 19 of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (legal aid) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (1) after ''an appeal'' there is inserted ''under this Part of this Act''. 
 (3) In subsection (1A) for ''for the purpose'' there is substituted ''in respect''. 
 (4) In subsection (1A)(a)— 
 (a) the words ''application for leave to'' are omitted, and 
 (b) after ''hearings)'' there is inserted ''or section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 (5) For subsection (1A)(b) there is substituted— 
 ''(b) any other appeal to the Court of Appeal under any Northern Ireland legislation (whenever passed or made) from proceedings before the Crown Court; or 
 (c) an application for leave to appeal in relation to an appeal mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) above.'' 
 (6) In subsection (3) for ''an appellant'' there is substituted ''a person''.'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 976 and 959.

Hilary Benn: The Government's policy intention is that criminal legal aid should be available for criminal proceedings in Northern Ireland. Existing legal aid legislation does not allow criminal legal aid to be granted for appeals to the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords under part 7, on trials on indictment without a jury, as extended to Northern Ireland, or under the Northern Ireland Order in Council that will be made to extend part 9, on prosecution appeals, to Northern Ireland.
 Government amendments Nos. 958 and 959 therefore extend the scope of section 19 of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 to ensure that criminal legal aid can be granted in Northern Ireland to a person—other than the prosecution—who appears before the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords as a consequence of an appeal under part 7 or under the order extending part 9 to Northern Ireland. 
 Those changes to legal aid provision in Northern Ireland are consistent with the approach that we have taken in England and Wales, where criminal legal aid is to be made available for such proceedings by way of amendment to secondary legislation. 
 Government amendment No. 976 will remove a duplication. Members of the Committee will have 
 spotted that paragraph 33 of schedule 25 duplicates an amendment in paragraph 17 of schedule 1.

Lady Hermon: May I say how much I welcome the extension of criminal legal aid to Northern Ireland, which brings the provisions in line with those in the rest of the United Kingdom? I appreciate the fact that the Minister is fully implementing the Belfast agreement in recognition of Northern Ireland's constitutional position. That is hugely important, given that criminal justice and justice are not devolved matters—they were not devolved before the suspension of the Assembly and they have still not been devolved. The changes are very welcome.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 976, in 
schedule 25, page 278, line 28, leave out from beginning to end of line 6 on page 279.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Schedule 25, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clause 267 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 26 - Repeals

Amendments made: No. 47, in 
schedule 26, page 279, line 39, column 2, leave out '22(3),' and insert 
 '22, in subsection (1) the words ''subject to section 25 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994'' and in subsection (3)'.
 No. 48, in 
schedule 26, page 280, line 16, column 2, leave out 'paragraph' and insert 'paragraphs 15 and'.
 No. 808, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 11, at end insert— 
 'Piracy Act 1837 (c.88) 
 Section 3.'
 No. 809, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 11, at end insert— 
 'Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (c.37) 
 In section 16(3), the words ''mandatory and''.'
 No. 810, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 13, column 2, leave out lines 12 and 13 and insert— 
 'In section 104, in subsection (1) the definition of ''suspended sentence'' and subsection (2).'
 No. 811, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 14, column 2, at beginning insert— 
 'In section 10— 
 subsection (2)(c) and the word ''or'' immediately preceding it, and subsection (3)(cc).'
 No. 812, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 32, column 2, at beginning insert— 
 'In section 68(2)(d), the words ''a probation order has been made in respect of him or he has been''.'
 No. 813, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 39, leave out 'paragraph (d)' and insert 'paragraph (c)'.
 No. 814, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 41, at end insert— 
 'Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (c.46) 
 In section 234—in subsection (2), the words from ''but does not'' to the end, subsection (5)(b) and the word ''and'' immediately preceding it, and subsection{**np**}(11).'
 No. 815, in 
schedule 26, page 282, line 41, at end insert— 
 'Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c.43) 
 Sections 35 and 40.' 
 —[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 816, in
schedule 26, page 282, line 41, at end insert— 
 'Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c.43) 
 In Schedule 4, paragraphs 6(2), 7, 12(1) and 15(10).'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 817 to 825, 827 to 832 and 834 to 838.

Hilary Benn: This is a large group of amendments, all of which are additions to the repeals schedule. To help hon. Members in their deliberations, I sent them a detailed description of the amendments in correspondence. I will therefore outline only briefly the four types of repeals involved.
 The most significant are those that repeal provisions that the Bill replaces. They include amendment No. 824, which relates to the definition of the terms ''sexual offence'' and ''violent offence''. Those are being replaced by the lists of sexual and violent offences in schedule 11. The groups also includes amendments Nos. 832, which deals with calculating remand time and which is replaced by clause 220, and 816, which relates to the role of the Parole Board, calculating remand time and dangerous offenders. 
 Another set repeals provisions that are being re-enacted in the Bill without change. The third and fourth category are second level repeals. That is to say, they repeal amendments or references to provisions that the Bill is repealing. The first level repeals that are at the base of those are either covered by the other categories that I have already described, or they have been already dealt with in Committee by being grouped with consequential amendments. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 817, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 2, column 2, at end insert— 
 'In section 38(4)(i), the words ''section 37(4A) or 65 of the 1991 Act or''. 
 'Sections 59 and 60.'
 No. 818, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 3, column 2, at end insert— 
 'Sections 99 and 100. 
 Sections 101(1) 
 Sections 103 to 105. 
 In Schedule 7, paragraph 50. 
 In Schedule 8, paragraphs 11, 13(2), 79 to 84, 86 to 91, 94, 97 and 132.'
 No. 819, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 3, at end insert— 
 'Access to Justice Act 1999 (c.22) 
 Section 58(5).' 
 No. 820, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 4, column 2, at beginning insert— 
 'Section 6(4)(d).'
 No. 593, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 22, column 2, at end insert— 
 'Section 84.'.
 No. 821, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 34, column 2, at end insert— 
 'In section 115, the word ''109,''. 
 Sections 116 and 117.'
 No. 822, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 36, column 2, at end insert— 
 'Sections 151 to 153.'
 No. 823, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 37, column 2, at end insert— 
 'In section 159, the words '', 121(1) or 123(1)'' and ''paragraph 6(6) of Schedule 4 to this Act,''.'
 No. 824, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 38, column 2, at end insert— 
 'Section 161(2) to (4).'
 No. 825, in 
schedule 26, page 283, line 38, column 2, at end insert— 
 'Section 162.'
 No. 826, in 
schedule 26, page 284, line 10, column 2, leave out from '''curfew order''' to 'the' in line 11 and insert 
 'the words ''section 59 above or'', ''or section 35 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997'', ''section 59 or'' and ''or the said section 35,'' '.
 No. 827, in 
schedule 26, page 284, line 14, after '11(2),' insert 
 ' ''presentence report'', ''protecting the public from serious harm'' '.
 No. 828, in 
schedule 26, page 284, line 18, after 'hearing'',' insert '''sexual offence'','.
 No. 829, in 
schedule 26, page 284, line 22, leave out 'and ''trigger offence''' and insert 
 ' ''trigger offence'' and ''violent offence''.'
 No. 830, in 
schedule 26, page 284, line 24, column 2, at end insert— 
 'Section 168(2).'
 No. 831, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 23, column 2, at end insert— 
 'In Schedule 9, paragraphs 7, 24(a), 26(2), 28, 29, 52, 54(3), 55, 61, 76, 81, 82, 89(2), 90(2), 137 to 145, 147(2) and (3)(a) to (d) and (e)(i), 151, 184, 185, 187(2), 174, 176(2) to (5) and (7), 177(2) and (3), 196 and 202.'
 No. 832, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 23, at end insert— 
 'Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11) 
 Schedule 15, paragraph 20.'
 No. 833, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 23, at end insert— 
 'Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 (c.19) 
 Section 62(10).' 
 No. 834, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 24, column 2, at end insert— 
 'Section 55.'
 No. 835, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 27, column 2, leave out line 27.
 No. 836, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 29, column 2, at end insert— 
 'In Schedule 7, paragraphs 139 and 140.'
 No. 837, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 29, at end insert— 
 'Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c.24) 
 Section 39(7).'. 
 No. 838, in 
schedule 26, page 285, line 29, at end insert— 
 'Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c.29) 
 In Schedule 11, paragraph 32.' 
 No. 876, in 
schedule 26, page 285, leave out lines 34 and 35 and insert— 
 'Vagrancy Act 1824 (c.83) 
 Section 5. 
 Section 10. 
 Railway Regulation Act 1842 (c.55) 
 In section 17, the words from ''be imprisoned'' (where first occurring) to ''discretion of such justice, shall''.'.
 No. 877, in 
schedule 26, page 285, column 2, leave out lines 38 to 43 and insert— 
 'In section 28, the words from '', or, in the discretion'' to ''fourteen days''.'.
 No. 878, in 
schedule 26, page 286, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert— 
 'North Sea Fisheries Act 1893 (c.17) 
 In section 2— 
 in paragraph (a), the words from '', or, in the discretion'' to the end, and 
 in paragraph (b), the words from '', or in the discretion'' to the end. 
 In section 3(a), the words from '', or, in the discretion'' to the end.'.
 No. 879, in 
schedule 26, page 286, line 15, at end insert— 
 'Public Health Act 1936 (c.49) 
 In section 287(5), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end. 
 Essential Commodities Reserves Act 1938 (c.51) 
 In section 4(2), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end. 
 London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 (c.xcvii) 
 In section 142(5), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end. 
 Cancer Act 1939 (c.13) 
 In section 4(2), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end. 
 Civil Defence Act 1939 (c.31) 
 In section 77, the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end.'
 No. 880, in 
schedule 26, page 286, line 31, at end insert— 
 'Civil Defence Act 1948 (c.5) 
 In section 4(4), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end.'.
 No. 881, in 
schedule 26, page 286, line 39, at end insert— 
 'Coast Protection Act 1949 (c.74) 
 In section 25(9), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end.'
 No. 882, in 
schedule 26, page 287, line 50, at end insert— 
 'Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961 (c.50) 
 In section 12(2), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end.'
 No. 883, in 
schedule 26, page 288, line 26, at end insert— 
 'Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 (c.12) 
 In section 16(5), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end. 
 In section 48(2), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end.'.
 No. 884, in 
schedule 26, page 288, line 36, column 2, at end insert— 
 'In section 69, the words from ''or imprisonment'' to the end.'.
 No. 885, in 
schedule 26, page 289, column 2, leave out lines 26 to 29.
 No. 886, in 
schedule 26, page 289, line 31, at end insert— 
 'Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c.48) 
 Section 70.'.
 No. 887, in 
schedule 26, page 290, line 20, at end insert— 
 'Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (c.8) 
 In Schedule 15, in paragraph 14(4), the words from ''or to imprisonment'' to the end.'.
 No. 888, in 
schedule 26, page 290, line 22, at end insert— 
 'Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c.53) 
 Section 26(5).'.
 No. 889, in 
schedule 26, page 290, column 2, leave out lines 33 and 34 and insert— 
 'In section 105(1), the words— 
 (a) ''to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or'', and 
 (b) ''or to both''.'.
 No. 890, in 
schedule 26, page 291, line 41, at end insert— 
 'Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (c.37) 
 In section 81, subsections (2) and (3).'
 No. 178, in 
schedule 26, page 293, line 3, at end insert— 
 'Bail Act 1976 (c.63) 
 In section 5(1)(c), the words ''a court or officer of a court appoints''.'
 No. 750, in 
schedule 26, page 293, line 8, at end insert— 
 'Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (c.25) 
 In Schedule 4, paragraph 16.'. 
 No. 959, in 
schedule 26, page 293, line 8, at end insert— 
 'Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (c.47) 
 In section 19(1A)(a), the words ''application for leave to''.'. 
 —[Hilary Benn.]
 Schedule 26, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 268 - Supplementary and consequential provision, etc.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: Following my suggestion about putting clauses 265 and 268 together, can the Minister explain why subsection (2) says:
''An order under subsection (1) may, in particular''
 do various things? The Government seem to be saying, ''Let's protect our opportunities.'' My understanding was that the clause is about supplementary, incidental and consequential changes, which are to do with the interrelationship between one Bill and another, and the timetables, which I entirely understand. In that case, the words ''in particular'' are not necessary and the provisions should be limited. There is no need for those words in any event, because clause 265 deals with the general power to do such things. The clause is meant to be specific, but those two words give a second opportunity to cover general matters, which are dealt with in clause 265. That seems to be unnecessary.

Hilary Benn: In general, the distinction between clauses 265 and 268 is that whereas clause 265 is about other powers in the Bill, clause 268 is free-standing. However, both can be about transitional provisions. Since we have said that we would consider the two together, I shall reflect on the point that the hon. Gentleman raised about the words, ''in particular''.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 268 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 24 - Transitory, transitional and saving provisions

Amendments made: No. 591, in 
schedule 24, page 274, line 1, leave out '16' and insert '17'.
 No. 592, in 
schedule 24, page 274, line 6, leave out '16' and insert '17'.—[Hilary Benn.] 
Question proposed, That this schedule, as amended, be the Twenty Fourth schedule to the Bill.

Simon Hughes: Will the Minister briefly explain the import of the schedule?

Hilary Benn: This schedule enables the Secretary of State to make any supplementary, incidental or consequential provisions, and any transitory, transitional or saving provisions when that is considered necessary or expedient, subject to the negative resolution procedures. The schedule also provides that when one provision of the Bill is brought into force before another, there is a power to modify the one brought into force to take account of the fact that the other is not yet in force. The provision also includes a general power to make consequential amendments to other Acts.
 Schedule 24 contains transitory and transitional proceedings and savings, which it may be helpful to explain. Section 61 of Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 lowers the age at which an offender can be in prison, from 21 to 18. The sentences of detention in a young offenders institution, custody for life and so on will disappear for that age group. 
 Paragraph 1 provides that if any of the sentencing provisions in part 12 come into force before section 61 of the 2000 Act is commenced, any order made under clause 268 or supplementary and consequential provisions can be used to adapt the provisions of part 12 to reflect the continuation, for the time being, of section 61. 
 Paragraph 2 makes it clear that the authority of the existing guidelines in judgments by the Court of Appeal is not affected by the repeal of relevant provisions in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. However, it also provides that they may be superseded in due course by guidelines produced by the Sentencing Guidelines Council. 
 The drug rehabilitation requirements in clauses 189 and 190 will replace the drug treatment and testing order. Paragraph 3 provides that DTTOs of less than 12 months do not have to contain provision for review by the courts. That aligns the DTTO with the new drug rehabilitation requirement. 
 In paragraph 4, section 65 of the Criminal Justice Act 1994 will be repealed as part of the wider sentencing changes in the Bill, but it is anticipated that that will occur after clause 239, which deals with drug testing requirements for offenders released on licence, comes into force. Paragraph 4 simply ensures that the new arrangements for drug testing set out in clause 239 will also apply to offenders supervised under section 65 of the 1991 Act until it is repealed.

Simon Hughes: That is helpful. I want the Minister to reflect on one issue arising from the age changes for young adult offenders. I am conscious that there have been debates for quite a long time about the implications of the creation of the Youth Justice Board. With widespread support both here and elsewhere, the Youth Justice Board has responsibility, as it has had from its inception, for the management of the regime for the youngest offenders in the teenage and young adult category. There has also been a debate about whether that might be extended to the next age group, which we touched on in earlier debates.
 The one thing that seems to remain inconsistent and somewhat illogical—I am not criticising the Minister, 
 but this was borne out in his explanation—is that these arrangements have changed the way in which we sentence 18 to 21-year-olds to bring them into mainstream provision, so that they can go to prison if necessary. I do not object to that, yet in many other parts of the criminal justice system in England and Wales—I do not know whether it is the same in Northern Ireland—the relevant age where adult provision starts seems to be 17. It strikes me that there needs to be consistency in the system. I have said elsewhere that I do not have hard and fixed views about where the boundaries should be, but they should obviously be set in light of experience and after wise deliberation. 
 It strikes me that the arrangements for holding young people in social services accommodation, and secure accommodation if necessary, means that once people reach age 16, young offenders provision applies. Such provision can also apply to people under 16 in some circumstances, but there appears to be another cut-off point at age 17 in the criminal justice system in relation to sentencing and where they are held. Schedule 24 introduces another age limit of 18, bringing 18 to 21-year-olds fully into the adult category. 
 I ask the Minister to reflect on those matters. The matter is not one necessarily to be debated and decided immediately. I appreciate that, in the Prison Service, the Youth Justice Board and the Home Office, and among others with an interest, such issues are subjects for continuing thought. If the Home Secretary hopes that we shall pass a measure of longer duration, and if we want to obtain the right balance between custody and non-custodial alternatives—given that there is widespread support for the Government's initiatives on alternative forms of disposal and the Halliday approach incorporated in the Bill—this might be the best opportunity to use for tidying matters up. 
 We also need to take into account as background the number of likely users for the services in question, with reference to young offenders institutions, under-17s and under-18s and others who might be looked after by the Youth Justice Board. I put the proposition in the most general of terms, but it would seem nonsensical, when the Bill is about the reform of the sentencing process as much as reform of the criminal justice process in the courts, not to deal with the issue and try to resolve it in a way that is logical for the Prison Service and society as a whole. Age limits are already complicated enough, without additional complications to the way in which people are treated by the courts and the prison system. 
 I have historically viewed 17 as the appropriate age at which to make a distinction. Others have argued, and in some cases persuaded me, that 16 is a better point of division, since under well-established practice it is the age at which people can work, pay taxes, join the services and get married, among other things. The Prime Minister has been reported as saying that the Government are thinking about lowering the voting age to 16. I appreciate that a simplistic answer cannot be applied across the entire range of public policy. However, it would be helpful if we could achieve the right result in the matter of which courts or parts of 
 the Prison Service deal with people as young people or children, and which deal with them as adults. There is much wisdom in this House and in the House of Lords. This opportunity may not recur in the foreseeable future. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Schedule 24, as amended, agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move,
That Schedule 24 be transferred to end of line 17 on page 293.
 The motion would move schedule 24, which has been misplaced, so that the schedules would be set out in an order in keeping with the sequence of the clauses that give them effect. On the reprinting of the Bill as amended, schedules 24 to 26 would automatically be renumbered. Schedule 25 would become schedule 24, schedule 26 would become schedule 25 and schedule 24 would assume its rightful place as schedule 26.

Dominic Grieve: From time to time in our proceedings, there has been some criticism of the parliamentary draftsmen, but I must say that their versatility is extraordinary. Whether one agrees with schedule 24 or not, how anyone can pull together the various strands of transitory, transitional and saving provisions and then rejig the Bill is an arcane mystery. I suspect that the Bill must have been a nightmare to put together, and this may be a good opportunity to express admiration for what has been done.
 Question put and agreed to.

Clause 269 - Provision for Northern Ireland

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 960, in
clause 269, page 149, line 4, after 'Part', insert '9 or'.
 Clause 269 extends parts of the Bill to Northern Ireland. Government amendment No. 960 adds part 9 to the list of those that can be extended to Northern Ireland using an Order in Council that is subject to the negative resolution procedure under section 85 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 or the schedule to the Northern Ireland Act 2000. We have done that because the Committee has had the opportunity to discuss the provisions of the Bill to which the amendment relates.

Lady Hermon: I want to put on the record how much I detest the use of Orders in Council to legislate for the people of Northern Ireland. When the Assembly was suspended on 14 October 2002, 22 Bills were before it, and all but one have been pushed through the House using Orders in Council. Northern Ireland Members who take their seats in this place—it is right that they do so, and I wish that the other four would, too—can talk until they are blue in the face, but they will not make a jot of difference to those Orders in Council. Will the Minister therefore explain why the Government have made this unsatisfactory procedure for legislating for the people of Northern Ireland even more offensive by opting for the negative rather than the affirmative resolution procedure? He
 might make me a little happier although, at the end of the day, Orders in Council are wholly inappropriate.

Simon Hughes: The hon. Lady knows that I absolutely agree with her concerns, and I have expressed the same view ever since I came to the House. The matter is not entirely the responsibility of the Home Office, although the Bill is. However, it is unacceptable that citizens in one part of the United Kingdom should not have the same rights as those in other parts. Their representatives should be able to debate and amend Government proposals that affect them. Representatives of people in Northern Ireland have a chance to debate and amend Bills that relate to the United Kingdom in general. Because of the constitutional nature of the Province, however, they cannot debate and amend proposals that relate only to Northern Ireland, which is absolutely unacceptable. It may, in theory, be possible to force a debate and to defeat them, but that is not possible in practice, because the Government will get their way. That could discredit politics in Northern Ireland and make people wonder why they should involve themselves in the political process if so much central legislation cannot be amended to benefit them.
 As the Minister rightly said, Bills are always improved by debate in Committee, on Report and so on. Home Officers Ministers regularly say that, and the Secretary of State and his predecessor did so, too. However, the same must apply to measures relating to Northern Ireland. 
 I again make a plea to the Minister, who is intelligent, sensitive and constitutionally alert to such issues. Will he pass back into the system the thought that it would hugely help the modernisation of Parliament if we changed the present arrangements once and for all? In that way, there would be equal rights for all citizens and Members of Parliament.

Hilary Benn: I hear the hon. Lady's point, which is clearly relevant to this amendment and the following one. I gladly undertake to draw the matter to my colleagues' attention. Particular issues obviously arise at present because the Assembly is suspended. In the light of that and of our debate about the principle behind the change, the Government feel that the proposals are the appropriate way forward.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 961, in
clause 269, page 149, line 5, leave out 'and (4)' and insert 'to (9)'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 962 and 963.

Hilary Benn: As I said a moment ago, the clause is concerned with the extension of certain parts of the Bill to Northern Ireland. Under section 85 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Assembly must be consulted on any Orders in Council that are to be made. Amendment No. 961 would remove consultation with the Northern Ireland Assembly for orders made under clause 269. As we have heard, criminal justice is a reserved matter in Northern Ireland, and in any event the Northern Ireland Assembly is currently suspended.
 Under paragraph 2 of the schedule to the Northern Ireland Act 2000, Orders in Council made under the schedule will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Amendments Nos. 962 and 963, like amendment No. 960, would ensure that Orders in Council made under the schedule for the purposes of clause 269 would be subject to the negative resolution procedure. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 962, in 
clause 269, page 149, line 10, after 'Northern Ireland)', insert— 
 '(a)'.
 No. 963, in 
clause 269, page 149, line 14, at end insert 
 'and 
 (b) the reference in subsection (1)(a) above to subsections (3) to (9) of that section shall be read as a reference to paragraph 2 of that Schedule.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Lady Hermon: I was disappointed that the Minister did not address my one specific question. I asked why the Government had decided to use the negative rather than the affirmative resolution procedure. I have grave reservations about and a bitter dislike of Orders in Council.
 The Minister may be aware of proposals for criminal justice and policing to be transferred to a devolved Assembly, which we hope to have in place after the acts of completion by republican paramilitaries. It may be good for justice and policing to be devolved to the Assembly, because the people of Northern Ireland and their elected representatives—the 108 Assembly Members—can scrutinise criminal justice and policing legislation. Things are wholly unsatisfactory as they are. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 269, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 270 - Expenses

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: I am conscious that we have only half an hour left of the morning sitting, but we have come to one of the most important clauses—important because it deals with the cost of the whole enterprise. I would have preferred a proper debate on the questions that flow from it, but we are not going to get one.
 The explanatory notes include a section on the financial effects of the Bill. It states that the cost of implementation in the first year will be £34 million, that it will cost £195 million next year and £301 million, £361 million, £378 million and £390 million in the following four financial years, and that there will be costs of the order of £390 million a year thereafter. Those are described as gross costs. It next states: 
''There will also be significant potential savings, although these have not yet been fully quantified.''
 My first question relates to those two elements, the costs and the savings. Is the Minister able to tell us whether there has been any change in the gross costs since we started working on the Bill; and more important, has any work been done on what might be the potential savings of the changes? 
 My second question relates to whether further progress has been made regarding the implementation date of custody plus and custody minus. One of the bases on which the Bill was intended to proceed was that we should move to that new regime, but we have received mixed messages as to whether and when the money will be available. It is no good passing laws relating to new systems that will not be implemented for years. 
 My third question concerns the fact that the average cost of keeping a prisoner inside is now £36,000 a year, as confirmed by today's papers. It would be helpful for the Minister to put on record the average annual cost of dealing with a prisoner who has a non-custodial sentence—such as a suspended sentence or a community order—so that both we and the public can make a comparison. 
 I appreciate that, for reasons of time, the Minister might have to reply to my fourth point later. Starting on page 129 of the explanatory notes, there is a page-long list of things that are described in paragraph 640 as 
''The main financial implications of the Bill for the public sector''.
 Some of those items are amplified in the following notes, but others are not mentioned. That is a general concern, but I will just concentrate on two matters. Can the Minister give an indication of the cost of the move to recording witness statements on video, which is covered in clauses 121 and 122? That is not amplified elsewhere. More important is the controversial change that we have discussed: 
''General limits on magistrates' court's power to impose imprisonment (clauses 137 to 139)'',
 which will increase the power to change to up to 12 months. It is flagged up as having a cost but that cost is not explained, as far as I can see. In paragraph 656 there is a general description of the cost of clauses 137 to 139. Has any work been done to assess the costs that would be incurred if magistrates' powers were to be extended beyond 12 months? 
 Lastly, I refer to the breakdown of the cost implications of the key areas in the second half of the list on page 130, which is not set out in the paragraphs up to the end of paragraph 659. Can the Minister ensure that we have them as soon as possible? 
 The Bill is described by the Government as having huge financial implications. The most interesting question is how much money it is expected to save. Ministers in the Home Office and in the Lord Chancellor's Department keep talking about having a more efficient criminal justice system. I would hope that that would mean that there were some savings, not just additional costs.

Dominic Grieve: I do not entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman that a reading of the financial effects of the
 Bill, as provided for in the explanatory notes, suggests that, by the standards of the Government's expenditure, there will be an enormous financial impact. There will be an enormous financial impact, but not necessarily for the reasons set out in the notes. I am not clear about the extent to which the increase in the number of people in custody is reflected in the notes. I suspect that it is not. I hazard the suggestion that that will be the single biggest element.
 If the Minister were in a position to help us, he might take us into the realms of saying that the Bill will be substantial in every sense: a financial Bill rather than a legislative Bill. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister on that. Of the other costs, although they are certainly not insubstantial, £7 million or £8 million seems to be money that the Exchequer puts into petty cash these days; although those sums matter very much to the taxpayer and to those who have to scrutinise Government expenditure. I am particularly concerned about the financial effect of the rising prison population. It is a very opaque area because there is a great deal of uncertainty about the real effect of this legislation on the prison population.

Hilary Benn: I cannot add much to what I have already told the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey about the phasing in of the implementation. The Government continue to reflect on the best and quickest way of doing that. As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, the major determining factor in the introduction of custody plus, a measure on which everyone is very keen, is increasing the capacity of the probation service. More money is being invested in the service and more staff are being recruited to it. The sooner those staff are in place, the quicker the measures can be effected. It might help if I say that revised costs and savings, which was the central thrust of the questions, will be provided in the explanatory notes when the Bill goes to the other place.
 I can give the hon. Gentleman some information about the cost of non-custodial sentences. For example, the cost of a community rehabilitation order is £2,030; including an accredited programme to it would add a further £350. A community punishment order costs £1,780; enhanced community punishment is slightly more costly at £1,895. A drug testing and treatment order costs £6,000, and a curfew order costs £1,600. The intensive control and change programme, which is in effect the equivalent of the intensive supervision and surveillance programme—ISSP—and which the probation service plans to pilot for 18 to 20-year-olds, costs about £6,000. I will reflect on the point that the hon. Gentleman made about further specific costing, where that is possible, in the explanatory notes. As I say, revised figures will be provided in further copies of the notes. 
 In relation to magistrates' sentencing powers and the courts' interpretation and use of the Bill's provisions, the Government have already said that they believe that the impact on the prison population will, when all the provisions have worked their way 
 through, be slightly below 1,000. I say that with the proviso that ultimately it will depend on courts' decisions on individual defendants. We must wait to see the sum total of all those decisions. We have tried to set out in the legislation the significant changes to the sentencing arrangements, particularly the new generic community sentences. They will provide greater flexibility, which, as everybody recognises, the system lacks at present. As effective community sentences are shown to reduce reoffending, the confidence of the courts and of the community in them will increase. We hope that that will be reflected in the position of the courts.

Dominic Grieve: I understand the Minister's reasoning. Indeed, it can be seen from the list that some of the biggest costs are those of the probation service for community sentences. I fully appreciate that there will be savings if community sentences are used rather than custodial sentences. The Halliday report has suggested that the prison population will rise as a result of this legislation. The Minister has not yet been able to deal with that issue. He should perhaps write to the Committee on the matter. I am interested to know the Government's estimate of the cost implications.

Hilary Benn: I was in the process of making a point about the net impact of all that. We can see what is currently happening to the prison population and we understand what has happened to it over the last decade or so. As we have previously discussed, what has happened has been the product of less use of fines and greater use of community penalties. There has also been greater use of custody, with sentences increasing in length. That is the explanation for the situation, at a time when the total number of people coming before the courts has remained largely the same and when crime has fallen. It will be the interrelationship between those factors that will determine the outcome. As we have discussed, and as all members of the Committee will agree, more successful collection of fines is a fundamental precondition to building greater confidence in fines and therefore encouraging the courts to make greater use of them.

Simon Hughes: The Minister is being straightforward, but I want to push him one step further. First, does his projection, when everything is worked through to the increase of 1,000 in the prison population, take into account both the increase in average sentence that he referred to and the figure that my hon. Friend quoted? Figures for the last available year published yesterday show an increase by five months to two years and two months.
 Secondly, does it take into account the prospective change for the magistrates courts' sentencing powers from six months to 12 months? I want to be clear that the expectation includes that, because the likelihood is that that will increase sentences passed by the magistrates court.

Hilary Benn: The assessment that the Government have made of just under 1,000 is based on the Bill's provisions, for obvious reasons. Separately from that, a process regarding custody length has been taking place. That is outwith the particular assessment in relation to the Bill but it has clearly informed the
 projections that were published recently suggesting what may happen to the prison population in future.
 In relation to magistrates' sentencing powers, I repeat the point that magistrates dealing with cases will have greater sentencing power. The current alternative would be for the case to be dealt with by the Crown court. There is no clear evidence that magistrates are likely to sentence more people to longer periods of custody than the Crown court would do under current arrangements. 
 It will remain to be seen how the interrelationship of all the changes contained in the Bill and the extent to which the courts make use of them will work. That will determine the answer to the question that the two hon. Gentlemen have quite rightly raised about the overall impact of those changes, especially on the prison population and, therefore, on the cost. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 270 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 271 - Commencement

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 966, in
clause 271, page 149, leave out line 23.
 The amendment seeks to change the commencement of the provisions in clause 248 and schedule 20 relating to the increasing penalties for drugs-related offences, a subject that has involved a great deal of debate within the Committee, from Royal Assent to a later date in accordance with a provision made by the Secretary of State. The interval is needed to ensure that the guidance needed to accompany the commencement of the provisions is in place. That partly answers a question that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey raised when we discussed those matters previously.

Simon Hughes: This is an interesting amendment. We, together with the hon. Members for Witney and for Beaconsfield and Labour Back Benchers, debated clause 248 at length and expressed considerable concern about it and about details that are developed in schedule 20. The fact that the amendment would remove that clause and schedule from the list in clause 271, and thus from immediate implementation, is therefore welcome. All that would be left in clause 271 would be the consequential provisions.
 The implication of what the Minister said is not entirely clear. I should like to push him a little to tell us more about the Government's thinking. I do not want to rerun the debate; we can probably finish in time if we keep things short. Our concern is that the Government are being inconsistent. I think that hon. Members from both Opposition parties have said that it is unlikely that clause 248 and schedule 20 will survive in their present form, because of inconsistency. We all intend to reflect, after the Committee's proceedings are over, on how to achieve the consistency that, irrespective of our different starting positions in considering this matter, we think would be better. 
 We shall obviously agree to the amendment, so that clause 248 will not come into force straight away. What process and timetable do the Government anticipate then? How will that relate to the changing of classification, which must be brought about by order, as I understand it, to amend the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971? How does it relate to any other timetables concerning the police or Crown Prosecution Service and the guidance?

Hilary Benn: To answer the specific question that has just been asked, the amendment—which I am glad the hon. Gentleman welcomes—allows the Government to fit together three things: first, the coming into force of the provisions under the Bill; secondly, the effective date for reclassification, which is dealt with in another way; and thirdly, making sure that the guidance needed to make all that work is in place. It obviously makes sense to secure the flexibility to fit all three bits together at the same time.

Simon Hughes: Yes, but let me put one last direct question to the Minister. What is the earliest date at which the Government expect or intend any changes in the maximum penalties to come into force?

Hilary Benn: I do not mean to be flippant when I say that the honest answer is in due course. The Government do not have a date in mind.

Dominic Grieve: Is not this making heavy weather of the fact that provision should never have been made for clause 248 to come into force on the passing of the Act? It had to be kept discrete, and that is what the amendment corrects.

Hilary Benn: The hon. Gentleman is right. That is why I am sure that the amendment will be passed.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 271, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 272 - Extent

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 711, in
clause 272, page 149, line 35, at end insert— 
 'Section (Transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland) and Schedule (Transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland);'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government new clause 13—Transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland. 
 Government new schedule 1—'Transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland.

Hilary Benn: The amendment, new clause and new schedule enable community orders to transfer to Scotland and Northern Ireland. The provisions are modelled on schedule 4 to the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, with modifications made necessary by the changes to community sentences in England and Wales. A community order can be transferred to Scotland and Northern Ireland either at the point of sentencing or during the sentence. When considering the transfer, it must appear to the court that the requirements can be complied with in
 the area where the offender proposes to go. The order must specify where in Scotland or Northern Ireland the offender will reside, and the appropriate local court, to which the sentencing or amending court will send all the relevant papers.
 The sentencing court will decide which order in Scotland or Northern Ireland corresponds to the community order. The offender will then serve his sentence, and be treated by the Scottish or Northern Ireland probation service equivalents, in the same way as though it had originally been made in Scotland or Northern Ireland. 
 If it appears to a Scottish or Northern Ireland court that the offender has failed to comply with any of the requirements of the order, or that the order should be revoked, with or without re-sentencing, that court may require the offender to appear before the court in England and Wales that originally sentenced him. The sentencing court can then deal with him in the way specified in schedule 7.

Dominic Grieve: On the face of it, this is a sensible amendment. The difficulty is the Committee's profound ignorance of the Scottish legal system—there may be exceptions to that, but the reality is that we do not know much about it, and even less now that it is devolved. I have one question. I assume that there is and will continue to be no difficulty in identifying a community sentence structure in Scotland that corresponds fully to that in England.
 I have a slight anxiety. If a different system develops, somebody may one day seek judicial review on the basis that the punishment to which he had been sentenced was being implemented differently. I do not want to be too esoteric about it, but that could become an issue—one that we need to keep in mind. However, I assume that the Minister has a dialogue with the Deputy First Minister and Minister for Justice in the Scottish Executive. 
 As time goes by, the trend—I remember it being described by the Scottish judiciary—has been for a coming together of the English and Scottish criminal legal systems. That process has been going on for a long period. Indeed, it was encouraged by the Government, probably for that reason. With devolution one can see separation coming about. Indeed, it has been highlighted during our debates that certain parts of the Bill are not being applied in Scotland. On the question of jury trial, Scotland did not feature. As a result, there will be profound differences in procedure north and south of the border. When it comes to sentencing and implementation, given that sentences can be served north of the border, a close degree of conformity is going to be needed if the system is to work; otherwise, I apprehend that there will come a moment when someone will say that the court gave him a sentence that is being implemented in a way that is at such variance with the way that it is being implemented south of the border, that it should not be proceeded with. I should be grateful for the Minister's comments.

Lady Hermon: I listened carefully to the Minister's introductory words. I welcome the extension of community orders to Scotland and Northern Ireland. That being the case, will the Minister explain the use of the conjunction ''or'' in amendment No. 711? It states:
''Transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland''.
 Why does it not use the word ''and''?

Simon Hughes: I have no objection in principle. I have regular meetings—I am about to have another—with my colleague and friend Jim Wallace, the Deputy First Minister and Minister for Justice of the Scottish Executive. I should be grateful if the Minister would say whether the extension of the provisions to Scotland has been discussed with and has the full agreement of the Scottish Executive. That is my understanding, but it is important that it is put on record.
 Northern Ireland is a more complex issue. Without wishing to trespass on the hon. Lady's territory, it would be helpful to know what consultation there has been about the proposal to extend the provisions to Northern Ireland. Who was asked, and who gave their assent? 
 Thirdly, I understand the point made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome said, there may be a greater leniency after transfer, as well as a greater severity, in terms of implementation of an order. The amendment relates specifically to community orders. Can the Minister tell us whether it is current policy in practice to transfer as soon as is practical somebody who is sentenced to a non-community sentence—that is, a custodial sentence—in Scotland, Northern Ireland, England or Wales to the part of the UK from which they come and to which they request to be transferred?

David Heath: I had a vision of people running away to Gretna Green to do their community sentences if there was indeed a difference in severity. But seriously, what are the financial provisions between the different probation services? Will there be a ''knock-knock'' basis on the assumption that the cost will be roughly equalised when there is a transfer between two jurisdictions, or will funds follow the offender in order to allow for the completion of a community order? Is a system envisaged, or is it simply assumed that the appropriate jurisdiction will make the necessary arrangements wherever that person is situated?

Hilary Benn: It might be helpful to say that we have consulted. However, the provisions, with minimal modifications, replicate what already exists and which is not extensively used. Principally, what is proposed is to cover circumstances when an offender, for whatever reason, has to move from England to Wales or from England to Northern Ireland. I am advised that ''or'' is the proper word; otherwise, the suggestion would be that one could live simultaneously in Northern Ireland and Scotland, which is why the wording is as it is.
 The probation service, the Scottish social work departments and others work together quite closely to ensure that things can work in practice. In answer to 
 the question that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked, appropriate recommendations will be made to the court. The amendment provides for the ability to transfer, but that is subject to the conditions and requirements that I explained. The amendment is premised on the basis of there being an order that corresponds appropriately to the community order that the court in England placed in the first instance. I am sure that you would rule me out of order, Mr. Illsley, if I talked about what might happen if the eventualities on which the hon. Gentleman speculated came to pass.

Dominic Grieve: I said wrongly that I was referring to jury trial, whereas in fact I was referring to the retrial provisions not being followed for serious offences. With a single legislature no longer dealing with both areas, the gap might widen over time, in terms of sentencing structures. I think that there is therefore a danger that someone might one day say, ''What is being applied in Scotland is sufficiently dissimilar from England to make this provision difficult to implement.''

Hilary Benn: I heard what the hon. Gentleman said earlier about the possibility that someone might bring a challenge. However, the provision's purpose is in large measure to accommodate people who have to move. That raises the question of to what extent they would want to balance their wish to move with the challenge of the terms that they would have to fulfil if they moved to Scotland or Northern Ireland. It is for the court to decide whether the order can be transferred, having had regard to the nature of the provisions.
 Finally, I undertake to write to the hon. Gentleman about prison transfers. A provision is in place, but I cannot quite remember what it is, so I will let him know. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Amendments made: No. 845, in 
clause 272, page 149, leave out line 36.
 No. 967, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 37, at end insert 
 'this Part, except sections 266 and 267'.
 No. 846, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 37, at end insert— 
 'paragraphs 3, 6 and 7 of Schedule (enabling powers:alteration of maximum penalties etc.).'.
 No. 968, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 38, at beginning insert 
 'The following provisions extend also to Scotland—'.
 No. 969, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 38, leave out '10(3)' and insert '11(3)'.
 No. 755, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 39, after 'provision)' insert— 
 'section (Execution of process between England and Wales and Scotland).'
 No. 847, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 39, after 'provision)' insert 
 'and paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of Schedule (enabling powers:alteration of maximum penalties etc.)'.
 No. 970, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 39, after 'provision)', insert— 
 'paragraph 2 of Schedule 16 (and section 242 so far as relating to that paragraph)'.
 No. 971, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 39, leave out 'extend also to Scotland'.
 No. 964, in 
clause 272, page 149, line 41, after 'Part 5;', insert 'Part 7;'.
 No. 972, in 
clause 272, page 149, leave out line 42.
 No. 973, in 
clause 272, page 150, line 12, leave out 'Part 3' and insert 'Parts 3 and 6'.
 No. 974, in 
clause 272, page 150, line 12, leave out 'that Part' and insert 'those Parts'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 272, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 273 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Adjourned at twenty-six minutes past Eleven o'clock till this day at half-past Two o'clock.